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Theses of lhe Russian Council Ol! Foreign and Defense Policy 
o presente artigo foi seleccionado para publicação, com a concordância do 
autor, a quem é devida uma palavra de reconhecimento, nomeadamente, pela 
tradução para inglês que elaborou a partir do seu comentário em língua alemã, 
expressamente para a revista Nação e Defesa. 
Resumo: 
Na primeira parte do artigo faz-se uma análise e comentam-se as teses que 
foram objecto de discussão por um grupo de altas entidades russas - políticos, 
investigadores e jornalistas - que se reuniu no «Council on Foreign and Defense 
Policy», em Maio do corrente ano. Na segunda parte do artigo são as referidas 
teses apresentadas em detalhe incluindo-se, no seu final, a relação das entidades 
presentes e os cargos que desempenham. 
Fundamentalmente, aponta-se a discordância quanto ao alargamento da 
NATO no senlido da Europa Central e de Leste, e a intenção de estabelecer o 
diálogo com os Estados membros da Aliança, a fim de evitar uma nova 
confrontação no relacionamento com a Rússia. 
Dr. Christoph Royen 
Sliflung Wissenschaft und Politik 
0-82067 EbenhausenlIsartal 
RUSSIAAND NATO 
Theses ofthe Russian Council 011 Foreigll and Defense Policy 
- Comments by Christoph Royen -
(Prepared for «Nação e Defesa», November 15, 1995 J(I) 
The enlargement of NATO with regard to Eastern Central Europe, even 
more so to the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithunia, encounters, by 
now, a broad front af resistance in Moscow. However, the theses «Russia and 
NATO», published in June 1995(') by the «Council on Foreign and Defense 
Policy» (Sovet po vneshney i oboronnoy politike [SVOPj), merit particular 
attention. The Council, initiated in 1992 by Sergey Karaganov, Deputy Direc-
tor of the «Institute of Europe» of the Russian Academy of Sciences and 
Member of the Presidential Council, unites important representatives of 
Moscow's foreign policy elite, i.e. politicians, researchers, and journalists. Two 
earlier general evaluations of Russia's foreign policy, which were presented by 
the Council in 1992 resp. in 1994('), had aroused considerable attention, in 
partícular because of their críticism directed at Foreign Minister Kozyrev. The 
present theses focus more narrowly on the actual discussion of NATO's 
enlargement. 
Western observers and participants in the discussion should become 
acquainted with the theses. Therefore this contribution to «Nação e Defesa» is 
augmented by the original Russian text's English translation distributed by the 
Council in Moscow. The translatíon corresponds exactly to the Russian 
original. 
(I) Based 00 the original Gennan version: Christoph Royen, Russland und die NATO: Thesen des 
russischen Rates für Aussen - und Verteidigungspolitik (SVOP) - Kommentar und Wortlaut, unpublished 
short analysis af the «5tiftung Wissenschaft und Politik» (SWP-KA 2912), Ebenhausen, Iuly 1995. 
(2) Nezavisimaja Gazeta, or. 89, JURe 21. 1995, p. 2. 
C) Strategiya dlya Rossii (Strategy for Russia), in: Nezavisimaja Gazeta, or. 158, August 19. 
1992. pp. 4-5; Strategiya dlya Rossii (2) (Strategy for Russia (2]); in: Nezavisimaja Gazeta. nr. 98, May 
27. 1994, pp. 4-5. 
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The authars and signatories of the document emphasize their intention to 
engage in a dialogue with partners in the member-states of NATO as well as 
in Eastern Central Europe(4) in order to avoid a new confrontation in the 
relationship with Russia. Neverthe1ess. it appears warranted to introduee the 
Council's text by some criticaI remarks and comments to draw attention to the 
questionable and debatable elements of the theses. 
COMMENTS QN THE THESES DF THE RUSSIAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN ANO DEFENSE PQLICY tSVÜP): 
«RUSSIA ANO NATO" 
With its theses the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy aims to prevent 
a NATO decision to enlarge. or hopes to contribute, at least, to NATO's 
postponement of a decision for another four or five years. This particular time 
Irame occurs several times in the document, but without an explanation why 
the authors - despite their basie disapproval - select just this speeifie period. 
Another recurrent element af lhe text consists in lhe assertion that Russian 
society rejeets NATO's enlargement ando henee, that enlargement would 
merely serve anti-Western and anti-reformist forces in Russia's political spectrum 
(1.3.2., point 3 / 1.3.4., poiOl l)('} This assertion has become a Russian 
standard argument since the presentation of the "Primakov Reporl», in late 
1993('), despite some surveys suggesting rather plausibly that many Russians 
worry more about how to feed themselves and their families than about foreign 
policy problems('~ Apparently, lhe Council expects to influence President 
Yeltsin to adopt the theses in a policy stalement as lhe official Russian view 
(2.3.8., par.2), thus redueing the compelenee of lhe eriticized Foreign Ministry 
(2.2.6.) under Andrey Kozyrev. In this context it is suggested (2.3.1., par. 2) to 
set up a special body direetly at the presidential statI, that would work out and 
(4) This aUlhor uses the term «Eastem Central Europe» for the foor members of the «Visegrád 
group». i.e. Poland, Czechia, Slovak.ia, and Hungnry. The SVOP-document, instead. uses Ihroughout lhe 
entire text lhe term «Central and Eastem Europe (CEE)>> which seems to comprise ali former Warsaw 
Pact coumries, excepl East Germany. 
C) References in brackets refer to lhe enumerntion both in the Russian original and in the English 
translation. 
(~) Cf. lzvestiya, November 26, 1993, p. 4; Nezavisimaya Gazeta. November 26. 1993, p. 113. Evge-
niy Primakov is lhe director of lhe Russian Externai Inlelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki). 
C) According lo surveys conducted by lhe respected Russian sociologist, (gor' Ki)'amkin, people in 
Russia hardly care even for developments within the «Commonwealth of Independem Stales) (eiS); cf. 
integrntsiya nachinaetsya «snizu» (llllegration starts «from belowl», in: Dela, nr. 30. July 1994, p. 1-2. 
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eoordinate policy. This body, in tum, should have a speeial division for 
European Security and NATO policy. 
Among the many signatories, whose consente') with the theses is not 
surprising (among others Aleksey Arbatov, Aleksandr Konovalov, Andrey 
Kortunov, Evgenly Kozhokin, Vladimir Lukin, Sergey Rogov, Vyacheslav 
Nikonov, Aleksey Pushkov, Pavel Zolotarev; also, for example, Oleg Bogomolov 
and Vitaliy Zhurkin), are also Dmitriy Trenin, who has expressed more than 
onee a different view('), and Sergey Jushenkov, who recently, too, had argued 
in an more differentiated way("'). 
Below those passages of the SVOP's text will be adduced, which deserve 
speeial interes!. Some of the points have not been raised before. 
I. 
In the first section defining Western, as well as East Central Eurapean and 
Russian interests, one finds an intriguing eharacterization of Germany (1.1.1., 
par. 5), for whieh NATO extension lo lhe Easl is 
«the proper form 01' a German züne 01' influence in the regioTI». 
However. in a ccrtain logical contrast to this statcment, the authors claim 
(1.2.2., point 3), the East Central Europeans hope 
«to partly counterbalance lhe dominating role of Germany in the region 
through membership in a common alliance». 
In anolher passage (2.2.1.) we read, the argument of the advocales of 
enlargemenl 
«is morally rewarding: NATO should respond lo the pleas of Central and 
East European countries which have suffered lhe mosl fram lhe 'Yalla 
politics' and the Cold wan>. 
(8) In an accompanying nole lhe editors of lhe Iheses explain (see below pp 155) lha! in addirion 
lo lhe members of lhe Council also some experts invited as guests have signed lhe document, bUl Ihat 
nol every signalory necessarily identifies himself wirh ali lhe passages of lhe tex!. 
C) Budel II NATO rasshiryat'sya na Voslok (Will NATO Enlarge towards lhe Easl'?). in: Novoe 
Vremya, nr. 43, Oclober 1994, p. 18-20. 
('U) Integratsiya s NATO - blago dlya Rossii (lntegrarion with NATO - a blessing for Russia), in: 
Novoe Vremya, nr. 23, June 1995. p. 22, Jushenkov, who is the Chainnan of the Dumu's Defense 
Commitee, argues for an «ussociated)} NATO-membership of his counlry. 
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But instead of thus explaining the fundamental interest of the East Central 
Europeans eorreetly and adopting the idea of a speeial historical responsibility 
of Germans and Russians for the sufferings of «Zwischeneuropa» [= «EUfope 
in between» l, the quoted passage merely serves to qualify it as a minority 
opinion. The position of the East Central Europeans is additionally devalued 
by giving (1.2.2., point 2) as one of their reasons to seek NATO membership, 
«hopes (almost eertainly futile) to come cio ser to the main goal, that is the 
EU membership, through membership in NATO». 
The EU member-states, on the other hand, which are not interested in the 
enlargement of the EU, would offer the East Central Europeans NATO 
membership as a sort of «compensatiom> (1.1. I, par. 7) [this explanation, to be 
true, is also to be found among various American opponents of NATO's 
enlargementl. 
The authors criticise (1.2.2., point I) 
«an almost complete negligenee displayed by lhe Russian diplomaey In 
[lhe Central and East Europeanl region». 
that 
«the new Russia '" could not change the negative lmage that 'she had 
inherited from the USSR», 
and maintain (2.1.7), 
«Russia is interested not in contraI, but in good-neighbor1y relations with 
these states». 
They declare even(") (2.3.2., par, I, point 3), Russian policy should find, 
«compromises that would as much as possible meet the interests of the 
countries of Central and Eastem Europe». 
However, traditional Russian-Soviet security thinking is revealed in lhe 
theses (1.3.4., point 4) that the: 
(1l) Somewhat difficult to reconcile with lhis resolve, however. is lhe passage, where lhe aUlhors 
insinuate lhat «a smalJ part of lhe political elite, as usual, is looking forward to high ranking and well· 
-paid posts in NATO slructures») (1.2.2., poiol 7). 
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«eliminalion of lhe bell of de facto neulral, and as a rule, weakly armed 
slales which has laken shape in lhe cenler of Europe following lhe demise 
of lhe Warsaw Pact, will deprive Russia of a major advantage achieved by 
her sorling oul of lhe Cold war: lhis will ... also revive rears». 
The quintessence. Iherefore, is conlained in lhe following passage (1.2.3.): 
«Russia does not consider these cauntries' membership in NATO as an 
optimum and well-balaneed response lo lheir anxiely: in Ihis case, security 
of lhe counlries of Central and Easlem Europe will be achieved aI lhe CoSI 
af security interests af Russia.» 
Yel, as in all olher available Russian slalements until now, also the 
Council's theses fail to provi de plausible seenarios whieh would explain 
potential dangers in order to open an honest discussion with NATO on how to 
meet understandable and reasonable Russian concems. 
Equally ambivalent appear the SVOP's remarks conceming the three 
Baltic slates("). On the one hand (2.3.5.4.) we read: 
«Initiating and promoting rapprochement with the Baltic states is of 
extraardinary importance. As a far more powerful country, Russia can 
afford to neglect some fairly predictable, although often annoying arid 
seemingly provocative symptoms of 'growing pains' in these states. This 
obviously does not mean lo ignore the violation of minority and other 
human rights.» 
On the other hand, however, the authors warn (1.3.6.): 
«The wish 01' the Baltic states to join NATO, which will only become 
slronger if the Alliance extends to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as 
any discussions and maneuvers around further enlargement, wiJl create a 
potential hotbed of real crisis in lhe center of Europe.» 
In the description of Russia's interests the «geopoliticab argument 
frequently used by Russian spokesmen to claim thal a foreign alliance system 
('1) Admittedly. as far as the Baltic states are concemed, also in me West only a few are 
advocating the extension of the Atlruuic alliance. See however Carl Bildl, The Bultic Slates Belong 
Tnside the Line Between NATO and Russia. in: Intemational Herald Tribune, May 6. 1995, p. 6. 
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next to Russia's borders necessarily means a hostile a!liance, is expressed 
(1.3.3., par. 3)(13) in a particular apodictic variante 
«The West did not (and could not) find arguments which would convince 
lhe Russian society lhat lhe advance of NATO to the borders( ") of Russia 
by embracing the former allies of the USSR ' .. would vitally serve the 
in terests of Russia.}) 
The idea that NATO's eastward extension means above ali lhe export of 
democratic stability to Eastern Cenlral Europe and that it should be in Russia's 
own interest to have neighbors, which gain self-confidence from being members 
of the Atlantic alliance, thus is brushed aside. 
Further we read (1.3.4., paim 2) - though hardly tenable from the position 
of international law("), that the West's decision to enlarge NATO 
«contravenes an obligation. that went without saying [in the Russian 
original: samo soboy razumevshikhsya obyazatel'stv], not to enlarge the 
Atlantic Alliance afler the Soviel Union gave its consent to the reunification 
of Germany». 
lI. 
The second part of lhe SVOP theses, containing recommendations. starls 
wilh those policies which should be avoided. In this conlexl lhe authors -
while criticizing offjcial government representatives which ear1y in 1995 had 
created the impression, Russia was ready to seek a compramise - postulale 
(2.1.2., par. I): 
(U) In the Russian original par. 4. 
(14) As long as NATO's extension is limiled to Eastem Cenlral Europe, Russia would be bordering 
00 extended NATO territory only with Poland in the exc\ave af lhe Kaliningrad (fomler North-Eastem 
Prussia). In this context, ooe should bc aware af recem Russian announcements lO fonify lhe 
Kaliningradska)'lI obh/st' iota a bastion af Russian military power. 
(11) Already in his unpublished letter to lhe govemmellls of four major NATO counlries in 
September 1993 Presidenl Yeltsin had argued, «the spirit» of lhe Two-plus - Four Treaty on Gerrnany's 
Reunifieation of September 1990 with its Iimitations for NATO aetivities on Easl Gerrnan territory 
«prec\udes ally eastward extension of the alliance»; cf. the unofficial translation of Yeltsin's lettcr in lhe 
Czech daily Mladâ Pronta Dnes, December 2, 1993, p. 9. However, sue h a fundamental restriction of 
NATQ's freedom can never result fram the inferes! of only one of lhe contracting parties nor from a mere 
conversation with other parties. Afler ali, Gorbachev aI Ihat time did nOI even think of a dissolution of 
lhe Warsaw Pact and therefore just did not bother to predude NATO's future expansion to Olher Soviet 
allies, Iike Poland, in wriuen fonn. Cf. Vladimir Sill/onov. Gorbachev i NATO (Gorbaehev and NATO). 
in: Delovoj Mir, May 27, 1995, p. 7. 
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«Offieial ar even semi-offieial talks on 'eompensating' Russia for NATO 
enlargement should be avoided at ali eosts. Sueh talks would only make 
an impression of Russia's eonsent to enlargement ... Nearly ali kinds of 
'compensation' will most probably anyway be given to Russia in case of 
enlargement». 
Therefore the authors emphasize (2.1.3.): 
«Russia should not yield to pressure of proponents of enlargement, that 
aim to gradually invol ve Russia into cooperation with NATO without 
giving firm guarantees that at least the aetual decision on enlargement will 
not be taken in the next 4 ar 5 years.» 
Thus, the authors of the theses clearly are eoncemed with closing the 
ranks at home in a broad front of opposition to NATO enlargement. This 
emerges also from the following sentence (2.1.4., par. I, point I) which at the 
same time - though unintentionally - reveals, that the stereotype insistence on 
dangers Russia must connect with NATO's enlargement, are hardly based on 
objective reasons: 
<<lt is unrealistic to hope that the development of Russia-NATO coopcration 
can go in parallel with the enlargement of the AlIiance: firstly, ali attempts 
to enhance cooperation make the enlargement much easier, since they 
implicitely remove the problem of Russia's objection.» 
Consequently, the SVOP authors maintain (2.1.4 .. par.4)("), that the 
«Partnership for Peace» programme 
«can play a positive role only lO case it substitutes NATO enlarge-
ment». 
Compared, though, with some of the most radical Russian voices a 
realistic admission is contained in the following admonishion (2.1.6.): 
«Speaking of possible countermeasures, we should not bluff and claim 10 
undertake such umealistic and costly steps as massive buildup ar re-
deployment of conventional forces. High-priced military countermeasures 
can only finally undermine our economy.» 
C") In the Russian original: par. 6. 
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Apparently, however, no bluff is inlended wilh lhe consideration (1.3.4., 
poinl 8), Ihat as the result of a decision to eXlend NATO, 
«Russia will probably be compelled to examine lhe possibility of greater 
politicaI reliance on nuclear 'containment' in Europe». 
Simultaneously, the Council appears rather confident. where the authors 
state (2.2.1, par. 1): 
«There is no consensus in the ruling circles of lhe West as regards the 
expediency of NATO enlargement. One can even assume Ihat the advocates 
af enlargement are in minority», 
and conclude, since NATO is operating on a consensus principIe (2 .2.1., par. 2). 
«such nature af lhe alliance gives vast opportunities to intluence its 
evolution». 
Hence they emphasize (2.2.1., par. 4): 
«A stronger voice of opponents of enlargement largely depends on the 
position of Russia ... Those skepticaI of the enlargement already prevail in 
defense ministries 01' mOsl NATO countries, and in politicaI circles of a 
centrisl and moderately conservative kind.» 
Quite openly the SVOP points (2.2.2) to particular promising fields for re-
enforcing Western opposition to NATO's enlargement: 
«Positions of potential opponents of enlargement are particular1y strong. 
if not prevailing, in such countries as Portugal, Spain, possibly Italy, Great 
Britain, France, and definitely Greece. In these eountries, they fear either 
the drain of resources. or the decline of NATO's stralegic attention to 
problems, which are most imminent for them, such as the threat of spill 
of instability from ex-Yugoslavia, instability and migration from the 
eountries of North Afriea, etc.» 
Thus it is obvious that the signatories do nOI intend to use lhe time-span 
of lhe nexl four or five years in order to adapt Russia to NATO enlargement. 
On the contrary, they hope to gain lhe time to mobilize resistance sufficient to 
kill the enlargement project definitely. 
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m. 
The concluding section «What Should Be Done» (2.3.) is largely dominated 
by repeating, without any new elements, Russia's favorite schemes for a 
European system of collective security and the pertinent roles for NATO and 
the OSCE (2.3.4.). For the security concerns of Eastern Central European 
countries the authors offer the following six solutions (2.3.6): 
(I) Bilateral security guarantees by Russia and NATO 
(2) Unilateral guarantees by NATO 
(3) Unilateral security guarantees by the United States, Germany, and 
other states, possibly codified as Ireaties 
(4) Simultaneous, although postponed, enlargement of the EU, WEU, and 
NATO 
(5) Enlargement of WEU in the first turn 
(6) Finally, as a last resort, en largement 01' political, not of military 
organization of NATO to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
[i.e. the «French» model]. 
While the first three «solutions», above ali the first, disregard the Eastern 
Central Europeans' and the Balts' unfortunate experiences with «guarantees» 
by outside forces and betray a complete lack oI' understanding, why these 
countries never again will agree to be objects of agreements by others, the 
fourth «solution» on first glance appears as indicating readiness lo compromise. 
However, as we saw above, the proposed «postponement» in the intention of 
lhe authors is merely meant to lead to eventual cancellation. 
11 is noteworthy, that the Council (1.3.4., point 6) rejects the idea of a 
partnerhip between two defense alliances, i.e. the «Euro-atlantic» NATO and 
the «Eurasiam> CIS, 
«since Russia will be left with weak and poor allies». 
With regard to the well-known problem of the «tlanks» in the CFE Treaty, 
the theses contain the following position (2.3.7.): 
«It is urgent to find ways for a unilateral or contractual solution of the 
problem of tlank quotas with NATO countries, or at least for a temporary 
revision of the CFE Treaty and its conditions (until the 1996 Conference). 
The formal violation of the Treaty by Russia can be heavily exploited by 
her opponents, as well as by advocates of NATO enlargemen!.» 
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IV. 
The conclusion is warranted that the number of dissidents in the Russian 
discussion on NATO's eastward extension is clearly dwindling. Moscow's 
foreign policy elites assembled in the SVOP constantly refer to lhe aIlegedly 
negative attitude of Russian society and crilieise (2.1.5, par. 3) NATO, because 
«regrettably, hasty statements about the intention to enlarge the aIliance have 
reversed the trend of NATO's image changing to the better in the eyes of the 
Russian public». However, the SVOP authors do not ask, whether they 
themselves, despite their long established high degree of familiarity with 
Western policy and NATO's workings, have failed(17) to help their own society 
to overcome still existing prejudices against NATO and to explain the positive 
consequences of NATO enlargement to Eastern Central Europe and the Baltie 
states for a demoeratie Russia. By refraining from such an engagemenl they 
ultimately partieipate - the brutal war in Cheehnya is only onee (1.1.5.) 
mentioned as a problem - in Yeltsin's poliey to cover the poor results of 
domestie reforrns by resorting to foreign poliey and to claim respeet for 
Russia's big power status and Russian «spheres of influence». 
Therefore, the governments of the Atlantie AlIianee, which - together with 
the member-candidates in Eastern Central Europe - have declared their 
willingness to include Russia as partner in European seeurity, will still.have to 
show much perseverance and patience to engage this partner in an apen 
dialogue. 
(11) Cf. also Poland's fonner Defense Minister Janusz Ofl)'Jzkiewicz in an interview in the Polish 
daily Rzeczpospolita. June 22. 1995, p. 24. 
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Theses of lhe Council 0/1 Foreign and Defense Policy(l) 
I. POLlTICAL CONTEXT: INTERESTS OF lHE WEST, CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE, AND RUSSIA 
The plans of NATO enlargement by admilting a number of countries of 
Central and Eastem Europe (CEE), whieh have provoked a lively and sometimes 
hard debate on both sides of the Atlantie, can lead to a serious erisis in the 
relations of Russia and the West - in faet, to first sueh erisis after the end of 
the Cold war. 
Now when Russia has outgrown her pro-Western rornanticism of previous 
years, that hampered the establishment of a balaneed partnership with the 
West, she is endangered by an oppasite extreme: a Soviet-type rhetarie of 
confrontation that will infringe Russia's national interests in ali senses. 
The danger af isalation or isalationism is quite real. There are poli ti cal 
groups in the West awailing Russia's faux pas that could provake a new Cold 
war. In Russia, too. various forces seek to provoke crisis in OUI relations with 
the outside world, so that the eountry would once again find herself in a malign 
encirclement, haunted by the «complex of besieged»: for some of them, this is 
the only available way to power, for others, this is the means to strengthen their 
hold on power with an «iron hand». 
A responsible leadership of Russia, as well as the Russian society should 
prevent any kind of «freezing» the coaperation with the West (a «cold peace»), 
ar pushing the country to a new military and politieal eonfrontation with the 
West. In the meanwhile, long-term interests of Russia should not be violated, 
whieh eould be the case in the event af NATO enlargement. In this respeet we 
should pursue a triple goal: 
• to understand the others - i.e. the motivations and interests of Qur 
partners in NATO, countries of CEE and the CIS in the question of 
NATO enlargement, 
• to understand ourse1ves - i.e. to identify our national interests as they 
apply to this issue, 
• to ehoose the optimum parameters of politieal conduct for ourselves and 
to offer our partners mutually aeceptable common solutions. 
(I) See below p.155. 
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1.1. INTERESTS OF THE WEST 
1.1.1. Underlying the willingness of part of the ruling circles in the West 
to enlarge NATO is a complex of varying interests. The principal one (roughly 
speaking, it accounts for more Ihan a half of ali interests behind the determi-
nation to enlarge) is the attempt to preserve the viability of the Atlantic 
AlIiance, and to build up the basis for the common foreign and security policy, 
defined by the Maastricht Treaty. Another interest shared by ali Western 
countries is to reinforce NATO as an instrument to keep the United States in 
the European syslem. Admission of the countries of CEE to NATO is also 
considered as an instrument of control over the policies of Germany in this 
particular region. 
With its former principal goal - containment of the military and ideological 
threat of the Soviet Union - no longer valid, NATO entered a period of 
unavoidable systemic crisis. Ali atternpts to find a new role for the AlIiance 
(<<containing» the threat from the South, peacemaking, etc.) did little in terms 
of substituting its principal goal. In the meanwhile, there's a lack of political 
will in the NATO circles to start sue h a radical transformation of the AlIiance 
which could place it aI the heart of the new system of collective security in 
Europe. 
Considering this, a large part of political, academic and bureaucratic 
cireles connected with NATO and dependent on it put forward the slogan 
which reads «enlargement ar death». According to this ideology, enlargement 
of the AlIiance will provi de it with new goals and prolong its life-term. 
Such ideology is particularly strong in the United States, where the 
obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty are considered to be the basis for 
the U.S. military and political presence in Europe and the main instrument of 
supporting the American influence on the continent. This is of particular 
importance since this influence fades away, and other centers of power, first of 
ali Germany, are on the rise. 
Germany, toa, has special interests in the enlargement. In Bonn, membership 
of the countries of CEE in NATO is seen as a proper form of the German lOne 
of influence in the region, since lhe rest of the West and nations of CEE 
themselves will be reassured by the possibility to keep Germany at bay through 
the mechanisms of lhe Atlantic AlIiance. 
Beside this, according to some concepts, the EU and WEU can not be 
enlarged without a simultaneous expansion of NATO, although lhe advocates 
of sue h view do nOI insist on an immediate NATO enlargement. 
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Having leamed of immense cost, of pulling Up former socialist economies 
to Western standards in the course of the German reunification, West Europeans 
have de facto revised the schedule of admitting the countries of CEE to the 
European Union. While earlier it was promised to take place by the end of the 
century, now il has been postponed for an indefinite period, and NATO 
membership is being offered as SOrl of a compensation to the East Europeans. 
1.1.2. The countries of Weslem Europe, especially Germany, are also 
inlerested in rcinforcing their near periphery, especially since reforms In 
Russia are slowing down, and the threal of inslability still persists. 
1.1.3. Alongside wilh this, there is an intention, particularly noticeable in 
the United States, to capitalize on lhe geopolitical acquisitions achieved 
lhrough lhe «victory» in the Cold war, so lhat Russia, even after sorting oul of 
lhe current crisis, would nol be able to proportionalely increase her political 
intluence in Europe. 
1.1.4, One should not dismiss the hopes of an absolule minority 01' 
Western politicians to provoke a new, leI even a farcical, Cold war, in order lO 
revive, aI least temporarily, lhe main «organizing principie» of NATO: lhe 
premi se of the «threat from lhe East». 
1.1.5. The arguments of proponenls of NATO enlargement, both in lhe 
West and in CEE, have been buttressed, and the posilions Df the Russian 
diplomacy have been substantially weakened by a number of faults on Russia's 
home front, first of ali by the armed contlict in Chechnya, by the manner of 
dccision-making on starting il, as well as by methods of engagement in it. 
1.2. INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL ANO EASTERN EUROPE 
1.2.1. The interest of lhe higher political leadship in the countries of CEE 
to join NATO has been lo a large extent initiated and is still stimulated by the 
Western proponents of enlargement. 
1.2,2, Alongside with this, the countries 01' CEE have their own reasons 
to seek to join NATO. One can cite a number of those: 
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• the desire to speed up integration into the Western community, to «return 
into Europe», if not through the main door, the EU, then aI least through 
the «side door», which is NATO; finally, to fill in the vacuum that have 
emerged in CEE, largely due to an almost complete negligence displayed 
by the Russian diplomacy in this region (the new Russia, that has nol 
made an appearance in the region, could not change the negative image 
that she had inherited from the USSR); 
• hopes (almost certainly futile) to come closer to the main goal, that is 
the EU membership, through membership in NATO; 
• the desire to partly counterbalance the dominant role of Germany in the 
region through membership in a common alliance; 
• fears of Russia's and/or Ukraine's tum towards aggressive policies or 
internaI instability in those countries; one should not also disregard 
plain anti-Russian sentiment; 
• the wish to partially secure Ihemselves againsl the possibility of an 
internaI social unrest; 
• a fairly lo partially secure themselves against the possibility of an 
internai social unrest; 
• a fairly small part of Central and Easl European advocates of NATO 
enlargement also have vague hopes that this development will provoke 
confrontation with Russia and tum their countries inta «front-line 
states», with lhe subsequent increase in political and economic suppart, 
etc.; 
finaly, a smalI part of the political elite, as usual, is looking forward to 
high-ranking and well-paid posts in NATO structures. 
1.2.3. Most of these interests are understandable and legitimate, as well as 
the desire of countries of CEE to join NATO or any other alliance. In principIe, 
Russia is interested in stability in the countries of the region, so that their 
politicalleadership feels relatively secure. But then, intercsts of Russia and the 
countries of CEE begin to diverge: Russia does not consider these countries' 
membership in NATO as an optimum and well-balanced response to their 
anxiety: in this case, security of the countries of CEE will be achieved at the 
cost of security interests of Russia. 
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1.3. MAIN INTERESTS OF RUSSIA 
1.3.1. The key geostrategic imerest 01 Russia is to preserve and develop 
good relations. if not a strategic alliance, with leading Westem countries and 
their coalitions. Taking into account the present and especially the prospective 
geostrategic position of Russia, her economic concems, cultural and historical 
traditions, our country is vitally interested in a close strategic alliance with the 
rest of Europe, and in a full-f1edged participation in a common European 
system of collective security. 
NATO enlargement can initiate a security process in which there will be 
no place for a full-scale participation of Russia. However, an effective and 
reliable security system in Europe is unimaginable without both NATO and 
Russia partaking in it. 
1.3.2. The situation would be different if Russia became a full member 01' 
NATO. In this contingency, the road would be open for a real, not a declarative, 
full-scale cooperation of Russia and NATO. A realistic assessment of this 
possibility, though, attests to its low feasibility: 
• firstly, NATO countries are not interested in such a development, at least 
until the situation in Russia becomes more stable and predictable: . 
• secondly, this will be opposed by the politicalleadership of the countries 
of CEE, fearing to find themselves in Russia's shadow even within 
NATO; 
thirdly, one must admit that many groups of the Russian society are not 
ready for such a development; also, this idea is rejected by a large part 
of the military leadership. 
1.3,3. Russia is nevertheless interested in the existence of NATO in its 
current capacity as a guarantor of stability in the relations along the West-West 
axis, and also in reforming and strengthening it as a reliable mechanism of 
European stability that can beco me one of the pillars of the new collective 
security architecture of the continent. The North Atlantie Treaty Organization 
as a defensive military and political union of democratic states is not a military 
threat for a democratic Russia. 
However. Russia can not disregard her olher key inleresl: achieving and 
strengthening social, poli ti cal and economic stability inside the country. It is 
from this point of view, which is political and psychological, that NATO 
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enlargement contradicts Russia's national interests. The danger lies in the 
emergence of the feeling of military and political isolation of Russia. in lhe 
revi vaI of anti-Weslern and militaristic lrends in lhe public. 
This is even more true. since lhe Wesl did nO! (and could nOl) find 
arguments which would convinee lhe Russian society lhal the advance of 
NATO to the borders of Russia by embracing lhe former allies of the USSR, 
speeulating on lhe idea of «Russian imperialism», would vitally serve the 
inleresls of Russia - especially considering the facl that Russia herself is left 
oul by expanding Allanlic Alliance. 
J .3.4. lt is highly probablc lhat lhe decision on expanding NATO eastwards 
will lead lo a ","nher of negarive cOllsequel1ces both for Russia and lhe 
international security: 
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• lhis can have a decisive influence and prompt such changes in Russian 
domestic politics that would tum Russia imo a revisionist power, 
inleresled nol in slrenghtening, bUl in undermining the emerging politieal 
arder in Europe which does nol meet her interesls; 
• lhis will radically undermine Russia's confidence in lhe policies of the 
Wesl whose decision lO enlarge NATO contravenes an obligation, lhal 
went without saying, not to enlarge the Atlamic Alliance after the Soviet 
Union gave its consent to lhe reunification af Germany, and is 'also in 
defiance 01' the c1aims of CEE eountries to have no inlention to join 
NATO afler lhe disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty; consequently, this 
will not only reinforee the posilions and arguments of radical anti-
Western isolatianists, but will also result in anti-Western evolulion of 
even the most part of traditional pro-Western elites; 
• sue h decision wil\ underrnine the geopolitieal, as well as conceptual 
basis of most arms limilation regimes; everyone. inc\uding Russia, will 
lose: the military and polítical situation will become less predictable, 
and new channels for the arms race may emerge; 
• elimination of the belt 01' de facto neutral, ando as a rule, weakly armed 
states which has taken shape in the center of Europe following the 
demise of lhe Warsaw Pact, will deprive Russia of a major advanlage 
achieved by her sorting out of the Cold war: this will deepen the feeling 
of injustice, and also revive fears, strengthening the positions of militarists 
and militarist thinking on both sides; 
• Russia may get an excuse and another reason to seek strategic allies, 
even if temporary, in lhe South and in the East; rivalry in Central Asia 
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beyond the frontiers of the former Soviet Union, and in the Middle East 
will intensify; 
• Russia will be compelled to enhance her efforts at creating an effective 
system of collective security and defense in the framework of the CIS: 
a development which will not only deepen the division of Europe, but 
may entail additional extremely detrimental military expenditure, since 
Russia will be left with weak and poor allies; 
• hard-line opponents of NATO expansion in Russia will get a chance to 
relate the mismanagement of domestic reform, as well as low profile of 
Russia in the contemporary world, to «unfairness» of the West, first of 
ali the United States; 
• in order to offset the possible increase of the feeling of vulnerability as 
a result of an even more drastic change of geostrategic balance, and to 
secure against the situation when her partners could be tempted to 
capitalize on this change, and she could become an object of political 
pressure, Russia will probably be compelled to examine the possibility 
of grealer political reliance on nuclear «containment» in Europe. 
1.3,5, ]f NATO enlargement takes place before a radical improvement of 
Russia's cooperation with the West on a broad range of issues, this will most 
likely further reduce the leverage of Russia in international relations, first'of 
ali in the dialogue with the West on political, economic and other issues, 
1.3.6. Being a partial solution to just one problem in the center of Europe 
(diminishing the feeling of strategic uncertainty among the pari of political 
leaders in CEE), NATO expansion will generate a number of much more 
serious problems. This implies turning the Baltic states and possibly Ukraine 
into the zone of bitter strategic rivalry. The wish of the Baltic states to join 
NATO, which will only become stronger if the AlIiance extends to CEE, as 
well as any discussions and maneuvers around further enlargement, will create 
a potential hotbed of real crisis in the center of Europe. 
2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1. WHAT SHOULD NOT BE DONE 
2.1.1. First of ali, we should not take for granted the idea thrust on us, that 
the decision on NATO enlargement is inevitable, let alone enlargement itself. 
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It is far from true. An active and reasonable policy can enable to defer for a 
long time. or even to avoid the enlargement of the Alliance. 
2.1.2. Offieial or semi-official talks on «compensating» Russia for NATO 
enlargement should be avoided at ali costs. Such talks would only make an 
impression of Russia's consent to enlargement, would pave the way for making 
a decision on enlargement. Nearly ali kinds of «compensatiom> will most 
probably anyway be given to Russia in case of enlargement. Beside this, such 
talks would prompt our Western parlners to store up «bargaining chips», would 
defer or postpone solutions for problems which could have been found in a 
normal diplomatic processo 
Regrettably, a number of statements by Russian representatives in January 
and February 1995 were interpreted by the West as the beginning of talks on 
«compensation» and as lhe reason to say of Moscow's cansent to enlargement, 
which was to the detriment of the interests of Russia. 
2.1.3. Russia should not yield to pressure of proponents of enlargement, 
that aim to gradually involve Russia into cooperation with NATO without 
giving firm guarantees that at least the actual decision on enlargement will not 
be taken in the next 4 or 5 years. 
2.1.4. It is unrealistic to hope that the development of Russia-NATO 
cooperation can go in parallel with the enlargemcnt of the Alliance: 
• firstly, ali attempts to enhance cooperation make the enlargement much 
easier, since they implicitly remove the problem of Russia's objclion; 
• secondly, Russian domestic reaction on NATO enlargement will invalidate 
the possibility of such cooperation. 
Unfortunately, a rather distant perspective of enlarging the Alliance 
already now considerably narrows the possibility for Russia-NATO cooperation, 
first 01' ali due to internaI Russian political and psychological reasons. 
In this context, proposals to prepare the trealy on Russia-NATO cooperation 
are even more counterproductive, if NATO does not undertake to postpone lhe 
deeision to enlarge eastwards aI least for several years, in order to get the 
cooperation, let alone the partnership lrealy, working. 
As to the «Partnership for Peace» program, it can play a positive role only 
in case it substitutes NATO enlargement. BUI if the course of events leads to 
148 
RUSS1A AND NATO - Theses of lhe Russüm Coullcil 011 Foreign and Defense Polic)' 
a quick NATO enlargement (before 4 or 5 years), the program is destined to 
beco me void, or even counterproductive. 
2.1.5. lt also seems unrealistic to bark on the possibility of a quick 
transformation of NATO, which could have made the enlargement more 
acceptable for Russia in psychological, as well as military and political terms. 
Firstly, NATO itself does not seem ready to undergo a radi-
caI transformation on the way from collective defense to collective secu-
rity. 
Secondly, the Russian public opinion is not likely to be ready to accept the 
enlargement of even a transformed alliance as something that is not hostile to 
the interests of Russia. Regrettably, hasty statements about the intention to 
enlarge the AlIiance have reversed the trend of NATO's image changing to the 
better in the eyes of the Russian public. 
We can also be caught in our own trap if we are told (Iet even with best 
intentions) of the decision to transform NATO, while the real transformation 
will be delayed, or will never take place. 
2.1.6. Speaking of possible countermeasures, we should not bluff and 
claim to undertake such unrealistic and costly steps as massive buildup or re-
-deployment of conventional forces. High-priced military countermeasures can 
only finally undermine our economy. 
2.1.7. Any statements that misrepresent Russia's intentions and interests as 
regards the countries of CEE should be avoided, in particular the claims «to 
retain them under controi>,. Russia is interested not in control, but in good-
-neighborly relations with these states. 
2.1.8. Russian policy towards the West should not be exclusively focused 
on the issue of NATO enlargement. This is JUSI a part, allhough a key part, of 
a broader context. Preoccupation with this only problem can narrow our 
possibility for maneuver. 
2.2. RESOURCES AT OUR DlSPOSAL 
2.2.1. There is no consensus in lhe ruling circles of the Wesl as regards lhe 
expediency of NATO enlargement. One can even assume thal rhe advocares of 
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enlargement are in minority. In the meanwhile, they occupy key posts in 
decision-making mechanisms, and they are still the most aclive group. Their 
argument is morally rewarding: NATO should respond to the pleas of Central 
and East European countries which have suffered the most from the «Yalta 
politics» and the Cold war. Finally, they managed to capitalize on the passivity 
of Russia's policy towards Central and Eastem Europe. 
One should keep in mind that NATO is a collective organization operating 
on a consensus principIe. Such nature of the alliance gives vast opportunities 
to influence its evolution. 
As enlargement becomes a eloser perspective, and its economic, military, 
political and cohesion-related costs become more obvious, the numbers of 
opponents of enlargement might grow, with their opposition getting stronger. 
This development can be largely prompted by debates in political and academic 
cireles in NATO countries, first of ali in the United States. Such debates can 
prevent a premature «political decisioo» on enlargement. 
A stronger voice of opponents of enlargement largely depends on the 
position of Russia, on a sensible combination of firmness and flexibility in her 
diplomacy. Those skeptical of the enlargement already prevail in defense 
ministries of most NATO countries, and in political cireles of a centrist and 
moderately conservative kind. 
2.2.2. Positions of potential opponents of enlargement are particularly 
strong, if not prevailing, in such countries as Portugal, Spain, possibly Haly. 
Great Britain, France, and definitely in Greece. In these countries, they fear 
either the drain of resources, or the decline of NATO's strategic attention to 
problems, which are most imminent for them, such as the threat of spill of 
instability from ex-Yugoslavia, instability and migration from the countries of 
North Afriea, etc. 
2.2.3. In the emerging situation, Russia has an option of interacting not 
with an opposition (or even a marginal opposition, as was often lhe case with 
the Soviet Union), but with main groups of lhe ruling classes in Weslem 
countries, that consider the decision to enlarge toa risky and/or toa costly. In 
pursuing a sensible stralegy of resisting the enlargemenl, Russia ean be going 
nol against the entire Wesl, but in a open or concealed alliance with a large part 
of its ruling cireles. We should not act against the West; instead, we should 
help it to avoid making a mistake dangerous for everyone, first of ali for the 
West itself. 
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2.2.4. Enlargement is a long process that is divided at least in three stages: 
• before the decision on enlargement is taken, 
after lhe decision is taken, during the talks on the conditions of joining 
NATO, during the preparation oftreaties, and their subsequent ratification, 
after the ratification. 
In each of these stages, there will be opportumtIes to "jom» in the 
emerging problems, partaking in discussions, provoking debates, assisting in 
policy changes, increasing potential poli ti cal costs of enlargement. 
2.2.5. Russia has enough experienced diplomats and experts that can work 
out and pursue a flexible enough strategy. We are no longer confined by 
ideological dogmas, unless we invent new ones. One needs only to make 
proper use of the existent potentia!. 
In Russia's ruling circles, there's an almost complete consensus as regards 
the rejeetion of NATO enlargement. Sueh strong eohesion is a potential 
advantage. 
There are several dozens of people in the Russian society - politieians, 
experts, businessmen - that enjoy popularity and trust among ruling circles in 
lhe West. One should also take into aceount a broad network of contacts 
between publie, political and business organizations. 
A democratically elected parliament, too, can play a constructive role. 
especially if its leaders are able to agree on eoordination of aetivities wíth the 
executive. 
2.2.6. It is quite possible that despite a good opportunity to play an 
effeetive polítical game, Russia will not be able to use ít due to disorganized 
mechanisms of foreign poliey. 
The main problem is the total laek of eoordination in Russian foreign 
poliey, both at the leveI of the entire executive, and within eertain agencies. 
Neither the staff of the President, nor that of the Seeurity Couneil, have 
the requisite personnel and authority for an effeetive coordination of foreign 
poliey. 
Finally, one of the flaws in the premises of Russian foreign poliey is the 
drastic decline in information eapaeity. 
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2.3. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
2.3.1. The first and foremost condition of successfully implementing any 
strategic or tactical plan pertains to organization: lhe fas/esr possible reform of 
foreign policy mechanisms. Without this, we are certain to fai!. 
One should go back to the idea found in the President's yearly Message 
to the Federal Assembly, that is to set up a special body directly at the 
presidential staff, that would work out and coordinate policy. Within such 
body, it is necessary to establish a speeial division for policy towards European 
security and NATO. 
2.3.2. Srraregic (long-rerm) goals of the Russian policy should be the 
following: 
• to break the link between NATO enlargement and the development of 
our partnership with the West in general, and with NATO in particular; 
to create a window of opportunity for establishing elose military and 
political cooperation with NATO, olher Western organizations, and 
individual countries of the West; 
• to prevent the enlargement of NATO while finding compromises 
that would as much as possible meet the interests of the couotries of 
CEE, as well as lhose countries and circles in lhe Wesl that favor 
enlargement; 
• if lhe enlargement nevertheless takes place, Russia should aim to involve 
il in a wider context of building a new syslem of collective securily. 
The mid-rerm is to eomplicate and defer lhe implementation of decision 
on enlargemenl, if it is nonelheless laken. 
The short-term goal is to achieve the maximum postponement of the 
decision to enlarge, to win lime for stabilizing lhe economic, social and 
political development of Russia, for overeoming xenophobic and isolationisl 
stereotypes. This will largely enhance the dialogue of Russia and the West on 
a broad range of issues, and will diminish the potential negative politieal and 
psychological eonsequences of NATO enlargement. 
2.3.3. The slrategy should not be aimed against the West, leI alone lhe 
eountries of CEE. Instead, its key element should be cooperation with lhose in 
the West who do not wanl to create new divisions, new sourees of confliets, or 
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to !Um Russia into a revisionist power; with those who fear the weakening, not 
the strengthening of NATO as a result of enlargement, etc. 
2.3.4. Russia should emphasize her vital interest in belonging to the 
European (Euro-Atlantic) security system, and her determination to proceed 
towards creating a system of collective security in Europe that could respond 
to real challenges to stability, first of ali those originating in South-Eastern 
Asia and in some regions of the former Soviet Union, and not in the region of 
CEE characterized by a high degree of stability. 
Russia should start a concrete dialogue with the West, first of ali through 
foreign policy and defense departments, on the cri teria of transformation of 
NATO, having in mind its ultimate change into a political structure, the basis 
for a new European system of collective security. 
One of the workable variants for such system is the further development 
of the OSCE with a view to transforming it into a UN regional arrangement, 
and the possible establishment of a directorate of this organization comprised 
of permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, the United States, 
France, Great Britain), with the addition of Germany(') and the representatives 
of main European organizations (lhe EU, WEU, NATO, and the CIS). 
Russia should also propose other ways for creating a system of collecti:te 
security in Europe, e.g. in the framework of a special treaty, or on the basis of 
transforming NATO into a common European system of collective security 
with an indispensable and immediate inclusion of Russia. 
2.3.5. Russia should be prepared to a contingency in which NATO 
nevertheless opts for a quick enlargement and thus minimizes the possibility 
for Russia cooperating with it: in this case, Russia should counterbalance it by 
enhancing cooperation with other organizations, as well as bilateral cooperation 
with European powers. 
2.3.5.1. In particular, Russia could already start to broaden political, as 
well as military and political interaction with the EU and WEU. 
It is high time to begin improving interaction in the military and political 
field, up to preparing a number of bilateral military and political treaties with 
such countries as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, as 
e) This can be regarded as Germany's first step towards permanent membership in lhe Security 
Council. 
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well as Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania. Such agreements could become the 
building blocks of the future new treaty on the system of colleclive European 
security, and a substantive compensation in case 01' enlargement. 
2.3.5.2. It is necessary to finally starl a sensible and friendly dialogue on 
military and political malters with the countries of CEE in arder to alleviate 
their fears as much as possible, to jointly fill in the security vacuum thal has 
emerged in this region, and to lay lhe ground for true good-neighborly 
relations in the future. As the intensity of problems in CEE will be decreasing, 
so will the need to enlarge NATO. 
2.3.5.3. It is worthwhile lo make proposals to a number of countries, in 
particular to Germany, France, Italy. Greece and Bulgaria. on improving joinl 
action in the oUI-of-Europe regions, firsl of ali in Asia. 
2.3.5.4. Initiating and promoling rapprochement with lhe Baltic states is 
of extraordinary imporlance. As a far more powerful country. Russia can afford 
to neglect some fairly predictable. although often annoying and seemingly 
provocative symptoms of «growing pains» in these states. This obviously does 
not mean to ignore the violation of minority and other human right •. 
As stated earlier, the enlargement of NATO can lurn the Baltic states inlo 
a potential hotbed of a biller crisis. At this paim. preventive diplomacy is 
needed. Beside this, cooperation with the Baltic stales is indispensable in 
itself. 
2.3.5.5. A permanent dialogue is needed with key members of the CIS 
(Ukraine, BelaTUs. and Kazakhstan) to discuss the approach to NATO 
enlargement, and, in the best case, to jointly elaborate a common policy 
towards the Alliance. including joint counteraction to its enlargement. 
2.3.6. It is necessary to put forward a mutually acceptable constructive 
alternative to a quick enlargement 01' NATO. which would lake due account of 
the apprehensions of lhe countries of CEE, and of their desire to join the 
European structures. 
For instance. this could in volve the following moves: 
• Bilateral security guarantees by Russia and NATO . 
• Unilateral guarantees by NATO. 
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• Unilateral security guarantees by the United States, Germany, and olher 
states, possibly codified as treaties. 
• Simultaneous, although postponed, enlargement of the EU, WEU. and 
NATO. 
• Enlargemenl of WEU in the tlrst lurn. 
• Finally, as a last resort, enlargement of political, not of military 
organization of NATO to the countries of CEE. 
2.3.7. It is urgent to find ways for a unilateral or contractual solution of 
the problem of flank quotas with NATO countries, or at least for a temporary 
revision of lhe CFE Treaty and its conditions (until the 1996 Conference). The 
formal violation of lhe Treaty by Russia can be heavily exploited by her 
opponents, as well as by advocates af NATO enlargement. 
2.3.8.11 is needed to give a chance for lhe cooperation between Russia and 
NATO, Russia and the West, to keep open a window of opportunity. 
A policy statement of the President af the Russian Federation on policy 
towards NATO is highly advisable. In particular, it could be stated that Russia 
seeks a strategic alliance with NATO. including a contractual one. In lhe 
meanwhile, commencing and testing such rapprochement requires 4 to 5 years, 
during which period NATO should undertake not to make a decision 'on 
enlargement. Instead, it should interact with its Eastern neighbors in lhe 
framework of the "Parlnership for Peace» programo ar by other means (see 
above). 
During this period, maximum efforts should be made lo establish closer 
relationship between Russia and the EU. 
C) These theses were prepared by a working group of lhe CFDP on Russia's policy lowards 
NATO. It comprised a number of CFDP members, well-known experts. members of lhe Parliament. 
high-ranking officials fram the foreign policy and «power» (defense. interior and security) agencies in 
their personal capacity. The work of lhe group was coordinaled by S.A. Karaganov. The warking group 
has held a number af meetings and seminars, some wilh the involvement of foreign experts, and 
generated a series of reports. The theses are indebted to articles and works of A. G. Arbatov, A.A. Belkin, 
G.D. Ivanov. A.A. Konovalov, A.V. Kortunov, S.Y. Kortunov, S.K. Oznobischev. A.K. Pushkov, D.B. 
Ryurikov. S.M. Rogov, D. V. Trenin, P.S. ZoJotaryov and others. The working group gives special thanks 
to TV Borisova and A.A. Belkin who organized its work and lhe preparation of theses. 
The theses were discussed ai lhe meeting on 25 May 1995, altended by CFDP members, 
guest experts. politicians and highcr officials of foreign policy and «power» agencies, Following 
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lhe discussion. the theses were revised and lhen signed by rnembers of lhe CFDP, politics and 
experts that agree with their main contents. According to lhe CFDP tradition. representatives of 
the bodies af lhe executive, incJuding thase who agreed with lhe contents, as a rule, refrained from 
signing. Those who signed lhe theses did 50 in their personal capacity. Not ali p!anks af lhe meses 
necessarily reflect lhe views af thase who signed lhe document. Rather, they fetlect a broad 
consensus on lhe theses underlying philosophy. 
The tbeses were signed by: CFDP members - A.V. Dolgolaptev, Deputy Chainnan af lhe 
Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly; A.V. Fedorov, Head af lhe Bureau af Special 
Information; S.N.Fedorov, Director General. «Eye Microsurgery» Center; V.O. Ispravnikov, Vice 
President of the Russian Liberal Economic Saciety; S.A. Karaganov, Deputy Director af the 
Institute af Europe; Member af the Presidential Advisary Council; Chairman, Board af the CFDP; 
LM. Kbakamada, Member of the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly; O.V. Kiselev, 
Chairman, MOSEXPO Joint Stock Company; Member af the Presidential Advisory Council; Ye. 
M. Kozbokin, Director, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies; V.P. Lukin, Chairman. Cammittee 
an Internatianal Relatians af the State Duma; 1. Ye. Malasbenko, Directar General. NTV; M.V. 
Massarsky, President. Associarian af lhe Enterprise Managers: N.V. Mikbailov, President. 
VYMPEL Interstate Jaint Stack Corporation; S.A. Mndoyants, Dírector General, Foundation for 
Development af Parliamenlarism in Russia; A.V. Mordovin, Vice Chairman. Baard af the CFDP; 
A.K. Pushkov, Direetar for Public Relatians. Member of lhe Baard. Public Russian Television; 
Calumnist. «Mascow News» Weekly; Member af the Board of Editors, «Fareign Paliey»; A.M. 
Salmin, Direetor. Russian Social and Palitical Center; V.T. Tretyakov, Editar-in-Chief. 
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper; A.V. Tsalko, President. Associarion for Social Protection 
of Disaetivated Military Servicemen «Otechestvo»; v.v. Vinogradov, President. INKOMBANK; 
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